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This thesis studies the proliferation of categories of developing countries within the UN, 
starting with the first formal category created by the organisation (the Least Developed 
Countries - LDC) and ending with the first negotiated LDC graduation case. 
Triangulation of data collected through literature review, document analysis, semi-
structured interviews and descriptive statistics allows the issue of differentiation or 
categorisation of developing countries to be examined in terms of two main factors: 
interest and power; studied separately and in relation to each other and analysed through 
(institutional) behaviour. The ultimate goal is to understand how interests shape and 
modify behaviour and how interests can be translated into policy decisions. 
To assist in the inquiry - by providing both a language for discussing the nature of 
these power/interests interactions, as well as a rich set of assumptions about processes 
similar to the ones underlying developing country differentiation efforts, this research is: 
(i) Generally framed in the disciplines of Political Economy and International 
Relations, and 
(ii) Draws inspiration from the principal-agent and structure-agency theories, and from 
the autonomous bureaucratic angle, counterweighted by constraints imposed by 
member states on the actions of IOs’ bureaucracies. 
This analytical framework is applied to: 
1. The “slicing up” of the general and undefined developing countries’ group in order 
to, within it, draw international attention to the Least Developed Country (LDC) 
group; the first intentional UN effort to differentiate among developing countries. 
Findings indicate that more advanced developing countries engaged with the UN 
proposal to “slice-up” the Third World more as a damage-control project (by 
settling for a harmless deal that would not jeopardise their interests), while 
developed countries viewed it as an opportunity to help advance their economic 
interests (namely through trade). However, by the time of the institutionalisation of 
the LDC category, UN bureaucratic interests were also being attended. 
Categorising LDCs became not just about the selfless provision of special 
treatment to that category of countries (the principals), but also about responding 
to the irreconcilable interests of three different groups (the agents): (i) developed 
and (ii) more advanced developing countries’ individual interests and (iii) UN 
bureaucratic preferences.  
2. The proliferation of categories of developing countries within the UN, segmenting 
the developing world even further, according to common traits. However, rather 
than creating predictability, rationality and transparency about rules and principles 
guiding the provision of special and differential treatment and protecting states 
against the vagaries of both large countries and powerful international 
bureaucracies, the proliferation of classifications injects the global governance 
system with opacity and discretion, enabling the exercise of power over smaller and 
weaker states. 
3. The case of Cape Verde’s LDC graduation; the first negotiated LDC graduation 
case and a thus far under-researched topic. This analysis demonstrates how, 
paradoxically, categorisation of developing countries can be perpetuated in time or 
prolonged beyond reasonable, with implications in terms of long-term aid 
dependence. Indeed, the extension of preferential treatment despite the loss of 
LDC status and the institutionalisation of a new transition framework that allows 
LDC graduates to linger in that category for an unclear period of time, creates a 
new implicit category of “graduated LDCs-in-transition”, which favours the status 
quo, validates the continued existence of the LDC bureaucratic apparatus, and 
legitimises further development interventions in these countries. Ultimately, under 
these circumstances, LDC graduation does not necessarily mean liberation from a 
dependent relationship. 
This in-depth investigation - anchored in the three above-mentioned angles of 
analysis - serves as a vehicle to understand apparently incongruous behaviour from UN 
bureaucracy and from the bureaucracies in member states, and to grasp the political 
economy of developing country categorisation/differentiation. In trying to understand 
who benefits from: (i) developing country categorisation, (ii) continuous proliferation 
and perpetuation of these categories, and (iii) graduation processes that still keep 
graduated countries in a dependent relationship, the ultimate goal is to bring out the 
interests and the power shifts motivating and resulting from this. 
By making this interest/power dynamics evident, the thesis’ main contributions are 
on two levels: (i) initiate an academic debate towards a political economy of developing 
country differentiation (a thus far under-researched field) and (ii) provide elements for a 
more balanced decision- and policy-making framework for categorising developing 
countries with the aim of providing them with special and differential treatment. 
 
 
 
 
